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THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE IN
CALIFORNIA: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS ON INITIATIVES CHANGING THE
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
Ernest L. Graves*
A growing body of opinion holds that the initiative process in
California and other states violates the Guarantee Clause of the
United States Constitution. Under that clause "[t]he United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government."' The theory is that initiatives, which are written and
enacted by the voters, thus bypassing the legislature, are a manifesta-
tion of "direct democracy." The Framers of our Constitution, the
theory goes, rejected direct democracy in favor of a representative-
republican-government. A considerable amount of historical litera-
ture supports this theory, much of it focusing on the distrust that
Madison and others had of factions and popular prejudices.2
Unfortunately, it has been nearly impossible to test this general
theory in American courts. Shortly after Oregon implemented the
nation's first initiative process, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Guarantee Clause challenge to the initiative process as
adopted in Oregon presented a nonjusticiable political question.
* Ernest Graves was a trial and appellate lawyer for 40 years, and is now an
inactive member of the California Bar. His litigation and writings have often in-
volved the constitutionality of California initiatives. He graduated from Loyola
Law School in 1954.
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
2. See THi FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Earle ed.,
1937) (advocating Hamilton's preferred model of republican government, which
included representation of the people by the legislature); THE FEDERALIST No.
10 (James Madison) (Edward Earle ed., 1937) (noting Madison's blunt distaste
for direct democracy); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Edward Earle
ed., 1937) (emphasizing the importance in a republic to guard one part of the so-
ciety against the injustice of the other part).
3. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912).
The initiative in Pacific States provided that telephone and telegraph companies
would be taxed at two percent of their annual gross income derived from intra-
state business. See id. at 135-36.
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Ordinarily, this would be a serious but not fatal impediment to judi-
cial review. State courts are under an equally strong mandate to en-
force the Supremacy Clause.4 If state initiatives violate the Guaran-
tee Clause, a state court should be competent to so hold. Yet some
state courts have also rejected such claims on grounds of nonjusti-
ciability. This, despite the fact that the political question doctrine is
an outgrowth of separation of powers at the federal level and should
have no bearing on the jurisdiction of state courts. State courts re-
cently have held that nonjusticiability is a substantive limitation to
the Guarantee Clause itself, rather than a jurisdictional defect.5 If
this theory is true, state courts are as powerless as their federal coun-
terparts to enforce this critical-indeed, foundational-feature of the
Constitution.
Accepting, for purposes of this Article, that no court is compe-
tent to invalidate'a state's adoption of a particular form of the initia-
tive process under the Guarantee Clause directly, they still can-and
must-enforce their own state constitutions with their adopted limits
and confines on the use of the initiative process. Thus, if a state con-
stitution imposed a restriction on governmental methods analogous
to or incorporating the Guarantee Clause, that restriction would be
justiciable and enforceable on its own merits.6
Of course, state constitutions may impose limits on state func-
tions beyond those found in the federal charter. It is an accepted
principle of federalism that while the states may not afford less pro-
tection than the federal guarantees under the Supremacy Clause,
they are at liberty to afford greater protection to their citizens than
the federal minimums.
7
As it turns out, the protection of a "Republican" form of gov-
ernment may be greater under California law than the minimum pro-
tection required by the federal guarantee itself. This Article briefly
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby....").
5. See, e.g., In re Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1996); Huddleston v.
Sawyer, 324 Ore. 597 (1997). But see VanSickle v. Shannahan, 511 P.2d 223
(Kan. 1973) (holding that cases arising under Article IV, Section 4 of the Consti-
tution are not necessarily nonjusticiable).
6. Guarantee Clause claims can also be litigated in disguise, by alleging a
violation of some other constitutional provision. See, e.g., Morrissey v. State, 951
P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998)(striking down State constitutional amendment for violating
Article V of the United States Constitution, even though the court's discussion
focused on the guarantee-clause).
7. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983); Raven v. Deukmejian,
52 Cal. 3d 336, 353-54, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 337 (1990).
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explores that possibility under the language of the California Consti-
tution.
Not only does the California Constitution preserve the guaran-
tee of republican government, it also preserves a distinction between
constitutional "revision" and "amendment."8 This distinction is in-
strumental to California's system of constitutional change. Most re-
forms can be accomplished through the "amendment" process.
Amendments are initiated either by the legislature or by the people
directly through the initiative process. However, if the change is sig-
nificant, either because it changes the structure of government or be-
cause it makes wholesale alterations in constitutional text, it will be
considered a "revision." Until recently, "revisions" required the
calling of a constitutional convention. These may now be com-
menced by the legislature. But, importantly, revisions may not be
made by initiative.
This amendment revision distinction may be analogous to the
Guarantee Clause. Initiatives which restructure California govern-
ment in an anti-republican manner may constitute revisions of the
constitution, hence beyond the initiative power.9 California courts
have the power to enforce this constitutional limitation, having done
so on several occasions.'0 Unfortunately, they have also devalued the
distinction in some cases, most notably in the Proposition 1311 case,
Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of
Equalization.12 There, the court failed to perceive a threat to republi-
can government by a "revision" of the state constitution through an
obvious restructuring of state government.
The question explored in this Article is whether state constitu-
tional provisions and corresponding state supreme court decisions
protect a republican government more than the federal guarantee. In
particular it will examine whether parts of Proposition 13 violate
California's constitutional guarantee of a republican government. It
will further explore whether the California Supreme Court erred in
8. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-3.
9. See Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 349-50, 801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334
('comprehensive changes' to the Constitution require more formality, discus-
sion and deliberation than is available through the initiative process").
10. See, e.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948); In re
Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 88 P. 270 (1906); Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 36 P. 424
(1894).
11. Proposition 13, in California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election 56-57
(June 6, 1978).
12. 22 Cal. 3d 208,583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
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expanding the definitional standard of "amendment" in the Amador
case.
13
Apart from the Supremacy Clause in the Federal Constitution,
California has expressly adopted and incorporated the Federal Con-
stitution as the supreme law of the State of California in its own con-
stitution. "The State of California is an inseparable part of the
United States of America, and the United States Constitution is the
supreme law of the land.' ' 14 A similar provision does not appear in
many state constitutions, suggesting that the clause may have opera-
tional effect.
The state charter further provides: "Rights guaranteed by this
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."'" Reading these two provisions together leads
one to the following proposition: California may not afford its citi-
zens less protection than provided in the United States Constitution,
but under the state powers reserved to it in the Tenth Amendment, it
may accord Californians greater protections. 6 These greater protec-
tions include those guarantiees in the Federal Constitution that may
not be enforceable on their own. Specifically, while the Guarantee
Clause in the Federal Constitution may be unenforceable in federal
13. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), Justice Scalia was
careful to limit the ruling to the "narrower" separation of powers issue and not
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as it "might dictate a similar re-
sult" to state enactments under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 217. This is
significant because the Kansas Supreme Court has held that the "separation of
powers" doctrine is secured to the states as part of the Guarantee Clause of Ar-
ticle IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution. See Van Sickle v. Shana-
han, 511 P.2d 223, 241 (Kan. 1973). If the Van Sickle view is accepted, then the
Plaut decision is binding on the states under the Guarantee Clause irrespective of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and further raises the issue of whether the Due
Process Clause picks up the California form of the federal guarantee of a repub-
lican form of government in Article IV, Section 4. See also Bauers v. Heisel, 361
F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967) (using the
separation principle under the Guarantee Clause to avoid unconstitutionally con-
structing the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to abolish judicial immunity); Kohler v.
Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 531 (1969)
(reviewing a state's plebiscitary action under both the due process and the guar-
antee clause, finding neither violated).
14. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1.
15. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
16. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 940
P.2d 797, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210 (1997) (stating "that the California Constitution 'is,
and always has been, a document of independent force', and that the rights em-
bodied in and protected by the state Constitution are not invariably identical to
rights contained in the federal Constitution") (internal citation omitted).
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court due to the political question doctrine, it is arguably enforceable
as an incorporated right in the state constitution.
The above proposition is surely true of those rights specified in
the state constitution that were copied from the Federal Constitution.
After Barron v. Baltimore7 it was understood that the Bill of Rights
did not apply to the states. Accordingly, state constitution drafters in
the mid- and late-nineteenth centuries included bills of rights in their
own state charters, sometimes copied verbatim from the Federal
Constitution.18 Once the United States Supreme Court began incor-
porating the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment,
making them applicable to the states, analogous state constitutional
provisions grew dormant.19 Nonetheless, state rights remain enforce-
able, independent of federal rights, even when all substance is
drained from the federal right.2° Indeed, an entire doctrine of Su-
preme Court jurisdiction-"adequate and independent state
grounds"-derives from their separate enforceability, and the recog-
nition that state-granted rights are often broader than their federal
counterparts.
21
This Article proposes that the state constitution guarantees Cali-
fornia a republican form of government. Moreover, this guarantee is
justiciable in state court. Under the general theory stated above, if
an initiative or regular legislation violates the guarantee, it must be
held invalid. This would be true for initiative constitutional amend-
ments, as it is for initiative statutes. If our right of republican gov-
ernment is to be altered, it can be done only by constitutional revi-
sion, not constitutional amendment, and certainly not by the very
process-initiative-that undermines the guarantee in the first place.
17. 32 U.S. (7. Pet.) 243 (1833).
1& See generally Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict: The Doc-
trine of Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95,99-101 (1993).
19. See generally Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: Some Observa-
tions on the Overlapping Spheres of State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3
WIDENER J. PuB. L. 25 (1993) (illustrating the interaction between state and fed-
eral constitutions); Van Cleave, supra note 16, at 106 (noting that "most state
courts looked to the guarantees pronounced by the United States Supreme Court
and simply fell in line with that Court's interpretation, not considering what their
own state constitution required").
20. See Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr.
774 (1976). Compare, for example, the United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments with California courts' inter-
pretation of Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the California Constitution. Diver-
gence in both cases lead to voter-initiated constitutional amendment.
21. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983).
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This article further posits that the California power of initiative is
limited to enacting amendments and laws. These terms are to be
strictly construed, as was done by the state supreme court in Liver-
more v. Waite,2 the court's first case dealing with the forms for con-
stitutional change. The limitations on constitutional alteration were
enacted (in the constitution of 1849, and confirmed in the constitu-
tion of 1879) in light of the then perceived state duty to protect a re-
publican form of government under the Guarantee Clause. Accord-
ingly, violations of these limitations should be justiciable in state
court under the Guarantee Clause, as incorporated into the state con-
stitution, as well as under more explicit restrictions on constitutional
change.
I. DIRECT VERSUS REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT: THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE.
James Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of
1 78 7 show that the Framers of the Constitution were quite certain
that the republican-representative-form of government they were
creating protected against the evils of direct democracy. 2 The guar-
antee of "Republican government" to every state in the Union was
proposed to the Convention as Resolution 11 by Governor Randolph
of Virginia.' As Madison recorded in his Notes, on May 31, 1787,
Randolph observed that the general object of the Constitution was to
provide a "cure" for the "evils" under which the United States la-
bored.26 "[I]n tracing these evils to their origin every man had found
it in the turbulence and follies of democracy... ."2 Randolph also
stated that the purpose of the Resolution was two-fold. First, to se-
cure a republican government and second, to suppress domestic
commotions.O
Before direct democracy-through voter approval of private ini-
tiatives-was adopted in California in 1911, the reach and scope of
the guarantee of republican government had been construed and
22. 102 Cal. 113,26 P. 424 (1894).
23. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1787) [hereinafter NOTES OF DEBATES].
24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 323 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
25. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 22, at 32; see also THE FEDERALIST No.
10 at 81-84 (James Madison).
26. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 22, at 42.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 321.
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applied by both the United States and California Supreme Courts.
On the federal side, the Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden29 an-
nounced the political question doctrine, holding that courts would
not use the Guarantee Clause to decide between competing groups
on the admission of a state to the Union, as that was a nonjusticiable
political question.3
The Court next considered the meaning of "Republican" in Mi-
nor v. Happersett,3' twenty-five years after Luther. After reviewing
the forms of state government existing at the time of the Constitu-
tion, the Court concluded that the term "Republican" in Article IV,
Section 4, meant representative government.32 It further noted that
"[t]he guarant[ee] necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States
themselves to provide such a government." 33
In 1906, in In re Pfahler,3 the California Supreme Court upheld a
Los Angeles municipal ordinance enacted by a local initiative against
a challenge that it violated the Guarantee Clause.3 ' Assuming the is-
sue presented a judicial question, 6 the court adjudicated that issue.
The majority opinion, citing Minor, traced the history of direct de-
mocracy in local and municipal affairs since the adoption of the Con-
stitution. The court concluded that the Guarantee Clause did not
prohibit the direct exercise of legislative power by the people of a
"subdivision of a state in strictly local affairs."' That the Pfahler
court felt subject to the duty to provide a republican form of govern-
ment as stated in Minor, is evident because both the majority and
29. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
30. The political question/nonjusticiability rule of Luther was reformulated in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 177 U.S. 533, 583
(1964), opening the door for the justiciability of some Guarantee Clause claims
even where a political question is involved, provided it is not the only issue and
there is no absence of judicially measurable standards.
Even application of the Luther standard has been questioned. As Justice Doug-
las observed, "[t]he statements in Luther v. Borden... that this guaranty is en-
forceable only by Congress or the Chief Executive is not maintainable." Id. at
242 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Also see Justice O'Connor's
critique of it, citing various decisions and legal scholars, in her extended com-
ments on the Guarantee Clause in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-
86 (1992).
31. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76 (1874).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 175.
34. 150 Cal. 71, 88 P. 270 (1906).
35. See id. at 92, 88 P. at 279.
36. The court noted, in passin& the Luther v. Borden decision. See id. at 77,
88 P. at 273.
37. IL (emphasis added).
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dissenting opinions mentioned Minor.8 The dissent observed, "every
act done by a state which is inconsistent with and violative of the the-
ory of a republican form of government is invalid."39
Thus, the California Supreme Court in Pfahler, using the same
historical analysis employed by the Court in Minor, distinguished,
under the Guarantee Clause, between allowable direct democracy at
the local or municipal level of government and the representative
democracy required at the state level. The two decisions are not in-
consistent with each other as they relate to the different forms of
state governance that existed when the Constitution was adopted.
What is of particular significance in the Pfahler decision is an
additional distinction the court made-or at least pointedly implied-
between enacting laws and changing the state constitution by initia-
tive.' In a precisely limited proviso, the court indicated that state
constitutional enactments might not be similarly treated.4' The court
cited a leading Oregon case, Kadderly v. Portland,42 stating that the
people of a state may "reserve the supervisory control as to general
state legislation afforded by the initiative and referendum.,
43
Kadderly upheld the 1902 Initiative and Referendum Amend-
ment to the Oregon Constitution.' It was the only case found by the
California Supreme Court that directly discussed the permissibility of
state initiatives under the Guarantee Clause. The Oregon amend-
ment reserved to the people the power to propose and enact laws and
amendments to the Constitution at the polls, independent of the Leg-
islature.45 It anticipated and informed the language of the 1911
amendment to the California Constitution installing the initiative
process in this state. Yet, the Pfahler court pointedly omitted any
reference to that part of the Oregon Constitution authorizing the use
of initiatives to enact amendments to the state constitution from the
court's limited approval of enacting statutes by initiative.46
Thus, the Pfahler court drew two distinctions under the Guaran-
tee Clause in the use of direct democracy by initiative. First, between
local and state government and second, between the use of initiatives
38. See id. at 76-77, 93, 88 P. at 272-73, 279.
39. Id. at 93, 88 P. at 279 (McFarland, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 77,88 P. at 273.
41. See id. at 77-78, 88 P. at 273-74.
42. 74 P. 710 (Or. 1903).
43. Pfahler, 150 Cal. at 77, 88 P. at 273.
44. See Kadderly, 74 P. at 721-22.
45. See id. at 712.
46. See Pfahler, 150 Cal. at 79, 88 P. at 273-74.
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to enact statutes and their use to amend state constitutions. Pfahler
approved the use of initiatives in local and municipal governance and
accepted, as decided by Kadderly, that initiatives could enact laws at
the state level without violating the Guarantee Clause.'
What makes Pfahler's omission even more noteworthy is that
Kadderly twice cited the California decision of Livermore v. Waite, 4 a
leading California case setting forth a carefully restricted view of the
amendment process under the California Constitution.49 Livermore
invalidated a constitutional amendment on the ground that it did not
satisfy the requirements for an amendment, even though it had been
put before the voters by the legislature, and had received majority
approval.'
Chief Justice Beatty presided over both the Livermore and
Pfahler courts, joining the majority in each case. Justice McFarland
also participated in both cases, joining a concurring opinion in
Livermore and authoring the lone dissent in Pfahler. In the Pfahler
dissent, after stating that the Guarantee Clause "declare[d] a great
constitutional principle,"51 Justice McFarland expressed his "regret at
the apparent readiness of many of the people to abandon prominent
features of our American system of government-the wisest and best
system ever yet devised and put into successful operation. 5 2
The California Supreme Court is presumed to be aware of its
own decisions. It can hardly be said that Justices Beatty and McFar-
land, who had agreed on a restrictive definition of "amendment" in
the Livermore decision, but disagreed in Pfahler whether initiatives
at the municipal level violated the Guarantee Clause, were unaware
of the distinction in the cases. Their opinions are reconciled by the
view that initiatives may adopt laws at the municipal level, but may
not lawfully enact amendments to the constitution. There are four
levels of direct governance by initiatives involved: (1) the municipal
level; (2) the level of laws or statutes of the state; (3) the level of
47. See id. at 77, 88 P. at 273.
48. 102 Cal. 113, 36 P. 424 (1894).
49. See Kadderly, 74 P. at 716.
50. See Livermore, 102 Cal. at 123-24,36 P. at 428. Livermore was decided 17
years before the initiative process was adopted. But the limitations noted in that
case on amending the constitution were preserved by the initiative process. See
McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P. 787 (1948).
51. Pfahler, 150 Cal. at 93,88 P. at 279 (McFarland, J., dissenting).
52- Id. at 95, 88 P. at 280 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
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amendments to the constitution as limited by the Livermore defini-
tion; and (4) the level of alterations to the constitution that exceed
the Livermore definitional standard of "amendment."
The Kadderly court never discussed the constitutional amend-
ment language in the Initiative and Referendum Amendment when
sustaining it under the Guarantee Clause. Instead, the court limited
its discussion to the enactment of laws, the sole issue before the
court.' Kadderly involved a law incorporating the city of Portland
that was passed by the legislature under an exception in the Initiative
and Referendum Amendment for laws passed for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. 4 A landowner
challenged the legality of a street and sewer assessment by the city,
the legality of the law making Portland a charter city, and the legality
of the Initiative and Referendum Amendment." The court rejected
all claims. 6 In doing so, the court was not called upon to discuss or
consider any distinction between the enactment of laws by initiative
and amendment to the constitution by the same means.
A. Changing the Constitution: Revision and Amendment
Statutes are not constitutions, and the enactment of a law is not
equivalent to changing a constitution. Constitutions set forth the
powers and organization of government, the principles under which it
operates, and the protected rights of the people. The only method of
changing the federal Constitution, as provided in Article V, is by an
amendment approved by a two-thirds vote of both houses and rati-
fied by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or by a conven-
tion proposing amendments called for by three-fourths of the states.
The Constitution does not permit ratification of a proposed amend-
ment through direct democracy. 8 As Madison noted in The Federal-
ist No. 43,59 the reason for the considerable difficulties in altering the
Constitution was to preserve and protect a stable and permanent
Constitution from a facility of change that would make it too
,,mutable. ,, 0
53. See Kadderly, 74 P. at 716.
54. Id. at 712.
55. Id. at 714-15.
56. Id. at 721-24.
57. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
58. See Hawkes v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 226-27 (1920); AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36
Cal. 3d 687, 701, 686 P.2d 609, 618-19, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 98 (1984).
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) (Benjamin Wright ed., 1966).
60. Id. at 315 (James Madison).
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California also recognizes that altering the constitution is more
significant than enacting a statute. Statutes may be passed by a ma-
jority of both legislative houses and signed by the governor, while any
change to the constitution through the legislature always requires a
two-thirds vote of both legislative branches and approval by the vot-
ers.6 California also recognizes a difference between greater and
lesser changes to its constitution by providing for two types of
changes: revision for the more significant reforms,62 and amendment
for less significant changes.6
The California purpose, like the federal purpose, of interposing a
difficult procedure for constitutional change by revision, is to protect
and preserve the permanence of the state document. As stated by
the California Supreme Court in Livermore, "the underlying princi-
ples upon which [the constitution] rests, as well as the substantial en-
tirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding na-
ture."" In distinguishing between the degree of change requiring the
use of the revision procedure and the degree of change permissible
under the amendment procedure through the legislature, Livermore
concluded that only "an addition or change within the lines of the
original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out
the purposes for which it was framed" are amendments under Article
XVIII of the constitution.65
B. The 1911 Amendment of Article IV, Section 1
In 1911, as part of the popular protest against Southern Pacific
Railroad's domination of the California legislature, the legislature
proposed and the people adopted an amendment to Article IV, Sec-
tion 1 of the California Constitution.' This authorized the people to
propose and enact laws and amendments to the constitution, and
61. See Cal. Const. art XVIII, §§ 1, 2,4.
62. Until 1962, a "revision" could only be proposed by a constitutional con-
vention. Now it may be accomplished through the Legislature and the voters.
Id§1.
63. See Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-19,36 P. 424,426 (1894).
64. Id. at 118, 36 P. at 426.
65. Id. at 118-19, 36 P. at 426.
66. The language was virtually identical to the 1902 Oregon Initiative and
Referendum Amendment which was codified in the state constitution. See OR.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. (2)(a) (authorizing people "to propose laws and amend-
ments to the Constitution and enact or reject them at an election independently
of the Legislative Assembly").
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adopt and reject the same at the polls, independent of the legisla-
ture.67
Several observations can be made regarding the 1911 Amend-
ment which bear on the types of constitutional change that can ,be
made by initiative. These follow from the drafters' deliberate use of
the term "amendment" to describe the scope of constitutional change
permitted. This is a restrictive term which provides the only safe-
guard against the relatively easy process of constitutional change cre-
ated by the Amendment.
First, although the constitution continued to require different
processes for altering the constitution and enacting laws when ac-
complished by the legislature, no such procedural distinction was
made when it came to private persons-the people-acting through
the initiative process. At the time of the 1911 Amendment, the pro-
cedural requirements for proposing and enacting laws and amend-
ments to the constitution by initiative were the same; they required
the same number of petition signatures to put an initiative on the
ballot.6 Thus, the 1911 Amendment eliminated the requirement of
super-majority approval (two-thirds vote of the legislature), making
it easier for private parties to propose constitutional change than for
the legislature to do so itself.
Second, although statutes are constrained by various substantive
limitations in the constitution, these limitations do not apply to
changing the constitution itself, by either representative or direct
democracy. The only substantive limitation imposed on constitu-
tional reform by initiative under the 1911 Amendment, is the limiting
word "amendment."
Third, when the initiative was proposed in 1911, it was presented
against a backdrop of Supreme Court decisions on the mechanisms
for constitutional change. In Livermore, the Court had announced a
strict construction of the term "amendment." In In re Pfahler, it had
approved initiative lawmaking at the local level, while omitting any
language approving amending the constitution by initiative even
67. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added). The language of the 1911
Amendment to Article IV, Section 1 authorizing the enactment of amendments
to the constitution has since been split off and placed in Article XVIII, Section 3.
It now reads as follows, "The electors may amend the Constitution by initiative."
CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
68. Petition signatures by electors equal to eight percent of the votes cast for
Governor at the last gubernatorial election. The number was reduced to five
percent in 1966 for the enactment of laws but remained at eight percent for ini-
tiative constitutional amendments. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
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under the restrictive Livermore standard. It is doubtful that mem-
bers of both legislative houses and the drafters of the amendment
were unaware of these cases, or the limitations they had imposed on
constitutional "amendment."
Finally, it is inconceivable that members of the legislature were
oblivious of the fact that by the enactment of the 1911 amendment,
the terms "revision" and "amendment" no longer just separated the
two types and procedures of changing the constitution under repre-
sentative government. Instead, they became terms for separating
changes to the constitution that require approval by representative
democracy from those changes that may be proposed by private in-
dividuals and enacted by plebiscite under direct democracy.69
The legislature went a good deal further than the Pfahler deci-
sion by proposing the use of initiatives to enact amendments to the
California Constitution. Presumably, the legislature understood that
the term "amendment" would be confined within the narrow Liver-
more standard, a definition which Pfahler had preserved by
69. While any constitutional change proposed through the legislature may be
debated and amended before it is put on the ballot, an initiative amendment pro-
posed by a private person must be accepted or rejected as given. See CAL.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. In 1912, the year after the acceptance of the California
initiative amendment, the United States Supreme Court considered a Guarantee
Clause challenge to a tax statute enacted by initiative under the 1902 Oregon
Initiative and Referendum Amendment. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). The Court rejected the challenge, holding that the
state's use of direct democracy by initiative presented a political, not a judicial
question. See id- at 149 (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)).
Because the Pacific States case is still cited as authority for the proposition that a
state use of direct democracy by initiative is not reviewable under the Guarantee
Clause, a few observations are appropriate. First, the Pacific States decision did
not adjudicate the constitutionality of the initiative process, but declined to re-
view it on the basis of the political question doctrine of the Luther case. See id.
at 151. This doctrine has since been generally relaxed by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) and seriously questioned in reference to the Guarantee Clause. See
New York v. United States, 565 U.S. 144 (1992). Second, the Court only had a
statute enacted by initiative before it, not a constitutional amendment enacted by
initiative. See Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 135. Third, the case involved the Oregon
constitutional initiative amendment and not the 1911 initiative amendment to the
California Constitution that was enacted after the California Supreme Court de-
cisions in Livermore and Pfahler. See id. at 133-34. It is the position here that
the decision in Pacific States is no longer controlling authority for the the non-
justiciability of state initiative action under the Guarantee Clause of the Federal
Constitution, nor, under Pfahler, is it authority for precluding a challenge to
amendments to the constitution by initiative beyond the Livermore definitional
standard of "amendment" either directly under the Guarantee Clause or under
due process and the Tenth Amendment.
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omission." Whether the legislature, in proposing the use of initiatives
to "amend" the constitution, also rejected the use of initiatives to ac-
complish reforms going beyond the Livermore standard, was an issue
to come before th6 Supreme Court and be resolved in McFadden v.
Jordan.7'
C. The 1948 Decision of McFadden v. Jordan
The California Supreme Court decided the scope of constitu-
tional change permissible by initiative in McFadden v. Jordan. The
court resolved what the legislature proposed and the people accepted
under the term "amendment" by enacting Article IV, Section 1, and
the role of the Livermore restrictive definitional standards.' The
court decided whether a proposed initiative amendment to the consti-
tution was indeed an amendment or was a revision that could not be
enacted by a majority vote at the polls. The court, in preventing the
proposed initiative amendment to the constitution from being put on
the ballot, concluded that use of initiative amendments to change the
constitution only extended to, and was limited by, the Livermore
definition of the word "amendment" in Article XVIII.7,
The McFadden court did not consider the validity of an enacted
amendment per se, but the permissibility of an amendment by a par-
ticular procedure and process. The court determined the extent and
scope of constitutional change permissible through the initiative
process under the California Constitution.
70. The 1911 voter information sheet (now a pamphlet) to approve Senate
proposal 22 to amend Article IV, Section 1 clearly demonstrates that the Legisla-
ture was acutely aware of both the Guarantee Clause and the Pfahler decision.
Senator Gates and Asemblyman Clark, who wrote in support of the amendment,
argued that initiatives were not new, referring to their use in the State of Oregon
and the City of Los Angeles (cf. Pfahler), as well as their earlier use in New
England, the latter being the historical basis used in Pfahler to uphold the use of
initiatives at the local or municipal level against a Guarantee Clause challenge.
Senator Wright, in authoring the opposition to the amendment in the voter in-
formation sheet, called it "so radical as to be almost revolutionary" in its ten-
dency to change "the republican form of our government." He wrote, "[t]he Su-
preme Court of the United States may yet hold that this amendment is in conflict
with that provision of the federal constitution which guarantees to each state a
republican form government." See Official Ballot Pamphlet (Oct. 10, 1911).
71. 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
72. See id
73. See id. at 331-32, 196 P.2d at 788.
74. See id. at 349-50, 196 P.2d at 799.
75. See id. at 345-51, 196 P.2d at 796-800.
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The court noted that the words "revision" and "amendment"
had "heretofore in controlling aspects been the subject of scrutiny
and exposition by this court., 7' The court then quoted the Livermore
definitional standards of those terms.? Immediately thereafter, the
court stated that "[t]he initiative power reserved by the people by
amendment to the Constitution in 1911 (art. IV, § 1) applies only to
the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments
[as defined in Livermore] to the Constitution' and does not purport
to extend to a constitutional revision."78 The 1911 amendment was
passed long after the Livermore decision and "is to be understood to
have been drafted in the light of the Livermore decision. ,'' This cor-
responds to the well established rule that "a legislative statute is...
presumed to have been enacted in the light of such existing judicial
decisions? as have a direct bearing upon it."'"
Having established the standard for determining the scope of
constitutional change permissible by initiative under Article IV, Sec-
tion 1, the McFadden Court reviewed the proposed amendment be-
fore it, finding that it failed to meet the standard." The court further
explicated the applicable standard in rejecting an attempt to expand
the definition of amendment under that article. The court stated:
The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear
when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment
relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a
constitutional convention as a protection against
improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they
understood that there was a real difference between
amendment and revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the
language of the initiative amendment.., to effect a breaking
down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction
appears to be scrupulously preserved by the express
declaration in the amendment (particularly in the light of
the Livermore case...) that the power to propose and vote
on 'amendments to the Constitution' is reserved directly to
76. Id. at 332, 196 P.2d at 789.
77. See id. at 332-33, 196 P.2d at 789.
78. Id. at 333, 196 P.2d at 789.
79. Id. at 334, 196 P.2d at 789.
80. This includes both Livermore and Pfahler.
81. McFadden, 32 Cal. 2d at 334, 196 P.2d at 790. It also corresponds to the
comments of Senators Gage and Wright and Assemblyman Clark in the 1911
voter informatin sheet. See supra note 69.
82. See McFadden, 32 Cal. 2d at 346, 196 P.2d at 796-97.
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the people in initiative proceedings, while leaving
unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to
constitutional revision, which revisional power and
procedure, it will be remembered, had already been
specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII."
The court observed that the construction of "amendment" pro-
posed by intervenors "would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the
bulwark so carefully erected and preserved.""
The court also rejected the contention that Article IV, Section 1
should be construed to "'give the people' the power to initiate di-
rectly a revision [a change beyond the Livermore amendment stan-
dard] as well as amendments" to prevent a possible "frustration of
the will of the people," the court stated that the method of revision in
Article XVIII "does not purport to be dispensed with, alternatively
or otherwise, by section I of article IV, reserving the power to pro-
pose, and prescribing generally the procedure for bringing to a vote,
'laws and amendments to the Constitution."'
85
The McFadden decision determined that the extent of direct
democracy to alter the primary document of the state by initiative
only extends to, and is limited by, the Livermore definitional stan-
dards of amendment and revision. Any proposal to change the Cali-
fornia Constitution which exceeds the Livermore limits constitutes a
revision that may not be enacted by the initiative method under the
1911 amendment to Article IV. Rather, it must be enacted through
the republican procedure provided by Article XVIII.
The Livermore definitional standards of revision and amend-
ment that were made a part of the 1911 enactment of the initiative
amendment to Article IV, Section 1 are not just any judicial con-
structions of these terms in the constitution. Rather, they serve as
the specific judicial limitation mandated for determining the scope of
the initiative power reserved to the people by that Article. Since the
Livermore definitions of these words is a mandated part of a consti-
tutional provision, they may not be altered except through a revision
or an amendment. Accordingly, the alteration of the standard in
Amador Valley, being neither a revision or amendment proposed
through the legislature nor an initiative accepted by the people,
83. Id. at 347-48, 196 P.2d at 798 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 348, 196 P.2d at 798. The construction proposed by the intervenors
is similar to the standard later created by Justice Richardson in the Amador Val-
ley decision.
85. Id. at 350, 169 P.2d at 799.
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violates due process-the requirements of Articles IV, XVIII, and
VI-and the separation of powers doctrine of Article III, Section 3.
Construction of the limited scope of constitutional change per-
missible by initiative under the 1911 amendment represented, in "the
fullest tenable measure" the "intention" of the legislature-
exercising the state power reserved in the Tenth Amendment-to
adopt direct democracy in California by proposing the amendment to
Article IV, Section 1.' This construction also represents the fullest
interpretation of the legislature's intent to exempt constitutional
change by amendment in Article IV from the republican form then
required by Article XVIII and secured by the Guarantee Clause in
California. Thus, any constitutional change exceeding the Livermore
standards enacted by initiative not only violates Article IV, but also
violates Article XVIII and the California form of the Guarantee
Clause.
D. The California Constitutional Structure
The California Constitution, before and after 1911, recognizes
revision and amendment as the only two types of permissible changes
to the document.' Together, these two types of constitutional al-
teration constitute the whole of constitutional change under the Cali-
fornia Constitution. They are complements of each other. If a given
change is not an amendment, it is necessarily a revision. These forms
of change are also inversely related, such that any increase in the ex-
tent of change permitted by amendment automatically results in a
corresponding decrease in the extent of changes requiring the revi-
sion procedure. Before the 1911 initiative amendment, there were
different procedures for effecting a revision and an amendment.
Both of these procedures were republican in form, requiring that all
changes to the constitution be made with the approval and participa-
tion of the legislature, as well as acceptance by the voters. The recip-
rocal structure of the procedure was only between two republican en-
actment forms. Each of these republican forms of constitutional
change was secured by the Guarantee Clause.
The above summary of the structure of constitutional change
existing under the California Constitution when Senate Proposal 22
was accepted by the voters helps define California's Guarantee
Clause in the area of constitutional change by initiative. First, since
86. McFadden, 32 Cal. 2d at 332, 196 P.2d at 788.
87. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
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the proposed amendment of the legislature only reserved amendment
and not revision from the existing republican structure, making it
subject to initiative, while leaving the existing structure untouched,
any revision by initiative beyond the Livermore standard violates the
California form of the guarantee of a republican form of government.
Second, since the extent of change permissible by the amendment to
Article IV proposed by the legislature constituted "the fullest tenable
measure" of the scope of permissible change intended by initiative,
any change beyond the fullest extent violates the required republican
form of Article XVIII and the Guarantee Clause in California.
By reserving the initiative power to change the constitution by
amendment, the 1911 amendment of Article IV necessarily made the
republican requirements of Article XVIII for enacting a revision and
the mandate of the Guarantee Clause subject to the same Livermore
standards. In other words, a proposed constitutional change by ini-
tiative beyond the Livermore standards violates Article IV; any such
constitutional change enacted by initiative is void as not having been
enacted by the republican procedure required by Article XVIII.
Such a constitutional change violates the Guarantee Clause by not
having been enacted under the republican form of government re-
quired by the State and Federal Constitutions.
E. The Intention of the Legislature
As McFadden determined, the scope of constitutional change
permitted initiatives by the amendment to Article IV-direct democ-
racy under the Tenth Amendment-is "to be understood to have
been drafted in the light of the Livermore decision" defining
"amendment" as "the fullest tenable measure" of the intention of the
legislature.u So too is it to be understood to have been drafted as the
fullest tenable measure of the intent of the legislature to remove con-
stitutional change from the republican forms of Article XVIII in light
of the clear implication of the 1906 Pfahler decision. Not only had the
legislature adopted the Livermore definition of the permissible extent
of the amendment power in Article IV, it also adopted the clear im-
plication of Pfahler on the permissible extent of the initiative process
in California. This was necessary to preserve republican government
as required by Article XVIII, incorporating the Guarantee Clause.
Thus, the legislature, in proposing the 1911 initiative process, ac-
cepted limitation on direct democracy contained in Article IV-per
88. McFadden, 32 Cal. 3d at 334, 196 P. 2d at 789-90.
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the Livermore decision-and the California limitation on the extent
of that power to erode the federal requirement of a republican form
of government in the Guarantee Clause-per the Pfahler decision.
The legislature intended to remove a certain quantum of consti-
tutional change from the republican forms of enactment required by
Article XVIII and make it available to direct democracy. The initia-
tive amendments itself manifested this intention as it adopted a new
plebiscitory procedure to alter the constitution to the limited extent
of enacting amendments, while leaving untouched the existing revi-
sion procedure of Article XVIII.
The three legislators in the voter information sheet of 1911
clearly demonstrated that the extent of the initiative power to enact
amendments to the constitution under Article IV was also the in-
tended limit of permissible initiative action to alter the constitution
under the Guarantee Clause in California. Senator Wright observed
that the extent of the initiative power in the amendment-as drafted
and limited in light of the Livermore definitional standard and the
Pfahler Guarantee discussion-might conflict with the guarantee of a
republican government.
While it is not for a state to decide with finality what degree of
direct democracy is acceptable under the Guarantee Clause in the
federal Constitution, it is up to a state under the Tenth Amendment
to decide what degree of direct democracy it accepts in state govern-
ance and the reciprocal level of the protection of a republican form of
government that it requires under the Guarantee Clause. The state is
at liberty in its constitution to accord its citizens a greater protection
of republican government than is federally required under the Guar-
antee Clause. These state-declared limits on the use of direct democ-
racy are then enforcable either under the Federal Guarantee Clause
or the greater state view of it.'°
One can assume that the Article IV power to change the consti-
tution by initiative amendment, as defined in Livermore, satisfies the
federal minimum requirement of a republican form of state govern-
ment. Nonetheless, the state was at liberty to decide the extent of di-
rect democracy to alter the constitution by initiatives it accepted as a
part of the California Constitution. It need not equate state consti-
tutional limits on the permissible extent of the initiative power with
89. See Official Ballot Pamphlet (Oct. 10, 1911).
90. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 1014 (1983); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52
Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
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the Guarantee Clause in the federal Constitution. However, the ar-
guments in the voter information sheet demonstrate that the legisla-
ture proposed and the people approved such limits on altering the
Constitution by initiative.
The court in McFadden could have rested its decision solely on
construction of the state constitution. However, the McFadden court
looked to the limits of the initiative power to change the basic state
document, not only on the construction of Articles IV and XVIII in
the state constitution, but also on the requirements of the guarantee
of a republican form of government in both the California Constitu-
tion and the United States Constitution.
While the McFadden opinion never mentions the Guarantee
Clause or the Pfahler decision, the court opened its discussion of the
extent of constitutional change permissible by initiative under the
1911 amendment to Article IV, and the acceptablity of the proposed
amendment before it under that standard, by stating that the pro-
posal at bench was "barred from the initiative upon any legally per-
missible construction of the pertinent constitutional provisions."91 This
language clearly refers to the "construction" of Articles IV and
XVIII and not the measurement of the proposed amendment against
that construction. The construction of Article IV involved the scope
of constitutional change permissible by initiative under the term
"amendment." The two key terms-amendment and initiative-in
the provision that the court was considering had been scrutinized and
interpreted in earlier supreme court decisions. The McFadden opin-
ion is presumed to have been drafted in light of the Livermore and
Pfahler decisions. The court's extended discussion of one-
Livermore-and failure to mention the other-Pfahler-is signifi-
cant.
The most immediate significance is that the court accepted that
the initiative power to change the constitution by amendment in Ar-
ticle IV, as limited by the Livermore standards of amendment and
revision, was a "legally permissible construction" of Article IV under
the Tenth Amendment that does not contravene the Guarantee
Clause. Since the McFadden Court determined that the initiative
power to change the constitution, when limited to the Livermore
standards did not, per se, violate the Guarantee Clause, there was no
need for the court to discuss Pfahler, as this view conformed to the
clear implication of the Pfahler decision. The issue would be
91. See McFadden, 32 Cal. 2d at 332, 196 P.2d at 788 (emphasis added).
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concluded: the initiative power to change the constitution, when
confined to the standards incorporated within Article IV, is permis-
sible under the powers of the state reserved to it by the Tenth
Amendment, and there is no necessity or reason to discuss Pfahler.
The conclusion of the McFadden Court that the proposed
amendment before it was barred upon "any legally permissible con-
struction" of the state constitution obviously was referring to the de-
mands of the United States Constitution, including the Guarantee
Clause in Article IV, Section 4, as well as the Pfahler construction
and application of that provision. The highest state court was con-
struing the state constitution., That court's construction was, of
course, limited by the requirement that it be a "legally permissible
construction" under the United States Constitution. The Guarantee
Clause is the provision of the Federal Constitution in which the
phrase "legally permissible construction" is most pertinent. In other
words, the court drew the line between the extent of permitted direct
democracy by initiatives under Article IV and the existing require-
ment of Article XVIII that changes in that document include the
participation and approval of the representative-republican-form
of democracy as required by the Guarantee Clause. The point at is-
sue in the case was the standard to be applied before determining the
validity of a proposed enactment under Article IV, Section 1. The
standard to be used in distinguishing between direct and representa-
tive democracy when changing the state constitution is that of the
Guarantee Clause.
In short, the McFadden decision determined that the permissible
scope of constitutional change by initiative intended by the legisla-
ture and accepted by the people by enacting the 1911 amendment to
Article IV, Section 1 was limited by the Livermore standards of
amendment and revision. This conclusion was not only required by
Articles IV and XVIII of the California Constitution, but this con-
struction of the provisions was the limit of "any legally permissible
construction" of those sections under the guarantee of a republican
form of government in both the the United States and California
Constitutions.
II. CONCLUSION
The State of California accepted the Livermore definitional
standards of "amendment" and "revision" as the limit of permissible
alteration of the California Constitution by initiative action under the
1911 amendment to Article IV, Section 1. Any constitutional change
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enacted by initiative in excess of that standard is void as beyond the
power of initiative. It is a violation of the republican requirements
for enactment in Article XVIII, and a violation of the Guarantee
Clause, as embodied in the California Constitution.
Since the Livennore definitional standards of "amendment" and
"revision" are to be read into the initiative process as the constitu-
tional criteria for determining if a given initiative amendment is
permissible, those standards may only be changed by constitutional
revision. Any attempted reformulation of the permissible limits of
constitutional change by initiative violates due process and the Guar-
antee Clause, both in the form of enactment and in its failure to ade-
quately protect a republican form of government for the State Con-
stitution. Moreover, any constitutional changes enacted by initiative
that exceed the Livermore definitional standards are void ab initio,
even though approved by a state court under a different standard, if
their original enactment would have violated the Guarantee Clauses
of the California and United States Constitutions.
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